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VOIP TECHNOLOGY IN GRASSROOTS POLITICS: TRANSFORMING
POLITICAL CULTURE AND PRACTICE?

Abstract
This article investigates how the adoption and use of digital technologies shape political
culture and practice in grassroots political groups, particularly focusing on how VOIP
technologies enable and/or constrain groups to work across physical space and form political
relationships amongst participants. Whilst this article is grounded in a case study of one
broad-based coalition in Sydney, Australia, the findings expand our understanding of how
digital technology shapes political culture and practice in grassroots spaces by (a) analysing
an organisation both before and after the adoption of VOIP technology and (b) focusing on a
case study where the organisation attempted to maintain rather than transform their political
culture and practice with the adoption of new digital organising methods. The article argues
that the instrumental benefits of digital technologies come at a cost: VOIP technologies may
constrain the formation of deep relationships and flatten distinctive political practices within
grassroots political organisations.
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This article investigates how the adoption and use of digital technologies shape political
culture and practice in grassroots political groups, particularly focusing on how digital
technologies enable and/or constrain groups to work across physical space and form political
relationships amongst participants. Whilst this article is grounded in a case study of one
broad-based coalition in Sydney, Australia, the findings expand our understanding of how
digital technology shapes political culture and practice in grassroots spaces by (a) analysing
an organisation both before and after the adoption of digital technology and (b) focusing on a

case study where the organisation attempted to maintain rather than transform their political
culture and practice with the adoption of digital technology. The case study in the article
confirms other studies of digital activism that highlight the instrumental benefits for
grassroots political groups in adopting digital technologies: the ease of gathering people
across wide geographic spaces (Dahlberg-Grundberg and Örestig 2017); and lowering
barriers to participation such as the time or financial investment required to attend meetings
or actions held in physical locations (Schradie 2018). The article shows, however, that
instrumental benefits come with a cost. The shift to digital organising spaces had an impact
upon the culture of the Sydney Alliance that demonstrates how these technologies may
constrain the formation of deep relationships and flatten distinctive political practices within
grassroots political organisations. The article responds to the call from Kaun and Uldam
(2018: 2099) to traverse ‘a two-dimensional axis of digital technologies and activist
practices’ in studies of digital activism in order to strike ‘the balance between context and
media-specificity’, and this article examines not only how activist practice is mediated by
digital technology, but also what activists ‘do with’ media – how the use of digital
technology is a practice in itself.
Existing sociological literature on digital activism has tended to be biased towards the
use of digital technologies to facilitate ‘mobilisation, coordination, and community building’
(Kavada 2010: 102) of mass-mobilisations, like the Arab Spring or Occupy movements
(Comunello, Mulargia, and Parisi 2016; Schradie 2018). The examination of ‘specific protest
movements and major demonstrations within them’ has meant that online activity is
sometimes ‘overstated’ and everyday practices are ‘disregarded’ (Comunello, Mulargia, and
Parisi 2016: 517). The novelty of digital technology adoption in social movements may also
be overstated: not only have movements historically quickly adopted prior technologies like
the ‘printing press, telegraph, radio [and] television’ (Carty 2015, 7); focusing on the

adoption of digital technology may obscure how ‘offline mobilization and communication
pathways’ remain significant (Maher and Earl 2017). Particularly neglected within the
literature has been an engagement with the impact of digital technologies on long-standing
‘organized political forms’ such as trade unions (Dencik and Wilkin 2019: 1) or broad-based
community organisations like the Sydney Alliance, often because such organisations have
been ‘slow adopters’ of and ‘adapters to’ new technology (Dencik and Wilkin 2019: 2).
Not only have particular ‘forms’ of political organisation been neglected in
sociological literature on digital activism, comparatively less attention has been paid to the
impact of digital technology on relational dynamics of grassroots political culture and
organising than to its impact on mobilising. My focus on the relational in this article stems
from both the Sydney Alliance’s own emphasis on relationality (Author 2020) and social
movement research, including my own, that demonstrates the significance of relationships
and social networks to successful mobilization (Diani DATE; Author 2018). Bennet and
Segerberg (2012: 755-6), in developing their theory of ‘connective’ action, outline how
newer forms of connective action differ from older forms of ‘collective’ action in terms of the
relational foundations of movements. Where collective action depended upon ‘brokering’
organisations and interpersonal relationships, connective action is either entirely ‘selforganising’ or only loosely makes use of formal organisations. Mobilising and organising
without interpersonal or organisational relationships is made possible by the new forms of
social media. These newer forms of connective action facilitated by social media and the
Internet enable the creation of an ‘instant community of insurgent practice’ that are able to
spontaneously mobilise large numbers of people, usually in response to ‘a spark of
indignation’ (Castells 2013: xl). However the lack of strong organizational ties mean such
mobilisations often dissipate as quickly as they emerge (Kavada 2010: 113); some scholars
argue this is because when digital platforms replace or reduce the role of social movement

organisations the development of ‘collective capacities’ like ‘decision-making, organizing,
and logistics work that build trust’ are also reduced (Dumitrica and Felt 2019: 3). Cammaerts
(2015: 446), however, writes that digital technology play an important role in the selfmediation of contemporary movements, where it is a tool used to construct collective
identity, ‘transform themselves’ and ‘constitute themselves as a subject’. Digital technology
is thus used by movements for more than just self-representation (Cammaerts 2015: 446) as
this article shows.
This article moves beyond an examination of how digital technology may undermine
collective capacity to analyse how an interpersonal political culture was replicated through
digital technology – where a grassroots organisation held on to a ‘collective action’ logic
despite the adoption of digital platforms to replace face-to-face interaction. However, as the
article will show, the widespread adoption of digital technologies by social movements
entails ‘paradoxical possibilities’ (Tuzcu 2016) where new ways of engaging in politics and
relating to others in movement spaces entails both opportunities and constraints.
Cammaerts’ (2015: 91) analysis of the ‘communication affordances’ of digital
technologies distinguishes between public and private; and synchronous and asynchronous
digital technologies: live streaming is both public and synchronous, while VOIP is private
and synchronous; a blog or newsfeed post is public and asynchronous, while email or SMS is
private and asynchronous. This typology of digital technologies is a helpful analytic tool in
studying how and why movements and organisations adopt and use particular digital
technologies, and how an ‘ecology’ of digital technologies working together facilitates
particular cultures of communication within organisations and movements. This article
examines the adoption of VOIP technology by a grassroots political organisation: where the
use of asynchronous, public digital technologies like Facebook and Twitter have been well

studied in digital activism literature, the study of synchronous private technologies like Zoom
has been relatively neglected.
Where the first part of this article analyses the relational culture of the Sydney
Alliance and the impact of digital technology upon it, part two of this article investigates how
the adoption of digital technologies impacts the spatial dynamics of a grassroots political
organisation and the relationship between space and political culture. There is a rich literature
on the entanglement and co-constitution of digital and physical space in urban studies and
geography, in particular. These studies typically examine the implications of such
entanglements for our understanding of space in online and offline worlds (Iranmanesh and
Alpar Atun 2020; Molnar 2014; Willems 2019). For example, Iranmanesh and Alpar Atun
(2020: 322) argue that emerging digital spaces are transforming urban space, and they write
that in contexts where the use of urban space is restricted – like during quarantine restrictions
– ‘social media provides an alternative space for everyday social and socio-spatial
interactions’
Early internet theorists were optimistic about the potential of the internet as an
emancipatory space (Daniels 2009; Loewenstein 2008) and some scholars of digital activism
position digital technologies and ‘mediated mobilisation’ as providing activists with a
‘structural advantage’ to those working exclusively offline (Moore-Gilbert 2018), or as a
‘third space’ or new public space outside existing regimes of power (Arora 2015; Hoover and
Echchaibi 2014; Smith and Halafoff 2020). Yet the case study in this article demonstrates
how mobilisation, organisation, and action may occur online but the political decision makers
and institutions that are the ultimate target of action exist in a relatively static offline power
structure. Whilst the internet provides an opportunity to escape some of the power structures
activists’ encounter in physical space (for example, Lee 2016), and some technology may be
‘socially shaped’ by the way individuals appropriate it within their daily practices

(Silverstone 1999: 252), the internet is not a power-neutral space and ‘technologies are
expressions of larger social and political structures rather than being independent of them’
(Kaun and Uldam 2018: 2102).

Method
This article is based on an ongoing, long-term ethnography conducted with the broad-based
community organisation the Sydney Alliance in Sydney, Australia primarily involving long
term participant observation and semi-structured interviews. The Sydney Alliance is a
grassroots political coalition of over 40 partner organisations including religious
congregations and groups, trade unions, service organisations, and other civil society groups.
It is a member of the Industrial Areas Foundation, an international network of broad-based
community organisations that follow an organising model initially developed by Saul Alinsky
in Chicago in the 1930s (Alinsky 1941). Ethnographic research methods, primarily consisting
of participant observation and interviews, is the favoured approach for recent studies of
broad-based community organisations in the United States of America and United Kingdom
(for example Braunstein 2017; Bretherton 2014; Wood 2007): the complexity of their internal
organisation and the diversity of coalition partner organisations and individual people
engaged the coalitions makes deep engagement as a researcher necessary to gain access and
understanding, whilst ethnographic methods provide rich, deep data on real-life behaviour in
relation to physical space, time, institutions, and ideas or beliefs (Travers 2001).
The ethnographic fieldwork for this project began in May 20181, when I started
participant observation of one campaign team in the Sydney Alliance: the ‘People Seeking
Asylum’ (PSA) team. I participated in the team’s regularly scheduled meetings and working
sub-groups; I attended the quarterly council meetings of the Sydney Alliance and a number of
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their actions; I attended their six-day residential training and have acted as a trainer on their
two-day ‘foundations’ training course twice. In late-2019 I also began participant observation
of a second campaign team that developed and organised a major campaign for 2020 called
‘Postcode 2020’. The launch of this campaign was interrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic
and morphed into the development of ‘local groups.’ I attended (online) meetings for one of
these groups over a period of two months in the first half of 2020 alongside my continued
observation of the PSA team. Where my participant observation occurred in physical
locations around Sydney until March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic forced the Sydney
Alliance to move their organising online and from mid-March the site of my fieldwork
shifted to online spaces (primarily Zoom meetings) constructed by the Sydney Alliance.
In addition to participant observation, between May 2018 and March 2020 I also
conducted 16 semi-structured interviews with regular members of the PSA team, staff
organisers of the Sydney Alliance, leaders of the partner organisations involved in the
coalition, and the founder of the Sydney Alliance.

Relational Impact of Digital Tools on Organizing
For broad-based community organisations like the Sydney Alliance, relationships are central
to both their political culture and their political power. Their organizing work and political
practices aim to build deep relationships between partner organisations and individual
participants oriented towards taking political action together. Historically, these ‘relational
practices’ have occurred face to face and the restrictions on public gathering implemented in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic presented the Sydney Alliance with a significant
challenge: whether it was possible to mediate their political practices through digital
technology, and whether doing so would transform the culture of the Sydney Alliance. As I
will show, whilst it is possible to replicate many formal political practices on a digital

platform such as Zoom the inherent constraints of any given digital platform will result in
some kind of loss. In the case of the Sydney Alliance, this was a loss of informal sociability
that would – long-term – risk diluting the depth of interpersonal relationships between
participants and introduce a more transactional culture.
The model of broad-based organising practiced by the Sydney Alliance seeks to
engage marginalised groups in political process and decision making at the local level,
ultimately with the aim of recreating communities for the ‘common good’ and to ‘replenish
democracy’ (Orr 2007: 10). Whilst each broad-based organisation is shaped by their
particular context, a broad framework forms the basis for coalitions like the Sydney Alliance.
Warren (2001: 91–92) describes it as (1) starting with ‘the institutional life that […] exists in
local communities’, (2) ‘develop[ing] cooperative ties and enhance[ing] the leadership
capacity of community members’, (3) the development of a collective identity and
‘commitment to the common good’, and (4) building power so that coalitions can intervene
‘successfully in politics and government.’ What this means in practice is that broad-based
community organisations are built from pre-existing civil society organisations with an active
membership base – like trade unions, religious congregations, and schools. They operate
according to the logic of ‘collective’ rather than ‘connective’ action (Bennet and Segerberg
2012). The coalitions dedicate significant time and effort into training and building
relationships between participants from different organisations; and participants are
encouraged to find the deep values and motivations they may hold in common despite
differences. Warren et al (2011: 67) argue that the ‘primary work’ of the professional
organizers who run the coalitions is ‘building relationships and power among people who
have common interests.’
Subscribing to a view of political capacity and power after Putnam and Campbell
(2010) that sees social capital as essential for civil society groups to wield any power in the

political sphere, broad-based community organisations see their power coming from the
relationships they build across diverse civil society organisations. As such, the coalitions
prioritise relationships above any particular issue. This is expressed by different coalitions in
different ways: ‘power before program’ is a slogan used by the coalition One LA (Warren et
al 2011: 71) whilst the Sydney Alliance states in all its trainings ‘relationships precede
action’ (Fieldnotes, 29th May 2018). The role of the organizer in a broad-based community
organization is not ’to win a few issues but to build an enduring formal organization that can
continue to claim power and resources for the community’ (Stall and Stoecker 1998).
‘Relational’ practices are thus central to the political culture and organising work of
coalitions like the Sydney Alliance. These practices are often formal and include one-to-one
‘relational meetings’ between organisers and participants, or between two participants; and
‘relational conversations’ – short carefully facilitated one-to-one or small group
conversations built into all meetings. Relational meetings and conversations involve
‘listening and storytelling, [and] asking constructive questions’ (Braunstein 2017: 46) and are
a carefully cultivated skill developed through the formal training offered by the Alliance to
all participants.
However, there are important aspects of the Sydney Alliance’s culture that make it
‘relational’ but are not contained within these formal practices. In particular, informal
sociability plays an important role in laying the ground upon which more formal relational
practices and political action can occur. Informal sociability can create a particular ‘affective
intensity’ that facilitates political conversations and – potentially – rapprochement across
difference (Kligler-Vilenchik 2019: 14); in an organisation as diverse as the Sydney Alliance
sociability thus contributes towards the formation of relationships that will, eventually, lead
to political action.

For example, a typical Sydney Alliance council meeting prior to late-March 2020
involved an informal shared meal before the meeting, where participants have time to catch
up and chat over food. The council meeting in early-March 2020 – the last in-person meeting
before the Sydney Alliance moved all its organising online – was held in the offices of a trade
union partner organisation in Sydney’s central business district. Arriving 40 minutes before
the start of the meeting, I found food laid out on platters in the large open-plan kitchen space
outside the meeting room and the room already buzzing with conversation. Whilst some
people took plates of food into the meeting room and sat down for in-depth conversations at
tables, most milled around in the kitchen area. Staff organizers wandered around greeting
everyone and occasionally making introductions. By the time the lead organiser began
hustling us into the meeting room to start the council meeting I had spoken to five different
people – two of whom I’d never met before – and made plans to have coffee in the coming
weeks with one of my new acquaintances for a more formal relational meeting (Fieldnotes,
4th March 2020).
The shift to organising exclusively online only a few short weeks later was a drastic
change for an organisation whose bread and butter was face to face organising. The Sydney
Alliance was not opposed to technology: like other social movements and organizations,
broad-based community organizations’ self-organization has been transformed by ‘mobile
phones […] and personal computers’ (Askanius 2012 in Kaun and Uldam 2018: 2100). The
Alliance had pre-existing digital infrastructure which it used to efficiently operate and
communicate with their leaders (and the international IAF network): a website,
organizational email accounts, a social media presence on Twitter and Facebook, and mobile
phones. The Alliance has a regular Monday email sent to their mailing list - ‘Across the
Alliance’, and most face-to-face meetings are organized by a combination of email
invitations and phone calls. However, these digital tools are predominantly used for

coordination purposes (Cammaerts 2015: 92), rather than as a platform for action. The real
‘work’ of the Sydney Alliance – relationship building, discernment and decision making, and
holding politicians to account – happens face to face.
In adopting a VOIP platform – Zoom – to mediate their organising work when they
were forced to shift to online organising, the Sydney Alliance organisers consciously
attempted to replicate their existing political practices online rather than adopt new ones.
From late-March 2020 the regular one-to-one meetings between organisers and leaders, the
campaign team meetings, and council meetings all were mediated by Zoom. Hjarvard (2008:
114) distinguishes between mediation – where communication is passed through a particular
media technology – and mediatization – a long-term process ‘whereby social and cultural
institutions and modes of interaction are changed as a result of the growth of the media’s
influence.’ Scholars of digital activism have argued that digital media has resulted in the
‘mediatization’ of activism: Bennett and Segerberg’s (2012) theory of ‘connective’ action
suggests the very logic of social movement action has changed from one premised on
collective organisation to personalised, horizontal networks like those found on social media
platforms.
However, Zoom is not a ‘social media’ where a movement constructs a public identity
and builds a horizontal network through which to spread information. Cammaerts (2015: 91)
categorises VOIP technologies like Zoom as ‘real time’ and ‘private/inward’ forms of digital
communication with more in common with older synchronous technologies like the
telephone than with social media. Users must know the ‘meeting ID’ of the Zoom call to join
– in the case of Alliance meetings, these were sent in email invitations to existing
participants. Zoom thus cannot be used – in this way, at least – to mobilize new participants
unconnected to the organisation; nor is information ‘shared’ on a public forum as in Twitter
or Facebook. Whilst the intention of the organizers in moving the Alliance’s political practice

from offline meetings to an online VOIP platform was to enable cultural continuity replicating exactly the particular relational practices of offline meetings on the online
platform - the move to Zoom did impact upon the culture of the Alliance.
The formal relational practices that are the foundation of the Alliance’s organising
culture were able to be mediated with little change on Zoom – although there was a short
learning curve for the organisers. At the first Council Meeting held on Zoom, the organisers
had not yet learned how to set up ‘breakout rooms’ where meeting participants could be
divided into smaller groups or pairs. The usual ‘relational conversation’ was thus not
feasible: with over 60 people on the call, having each person share a personal reflection
would take over an hour. Instead, the meeting chair asked a representative from each partner
organisation present to share a reflection on the top challenge they were facing as an
organisation due to the COVID-19 crisis (Fieldnotes, 23rd March 2020). Where each
participant would usually get a chance to have a structured and reflective conversation with
either one other person, or a small group focused upon their personal experience, values, and
motivations – the meeting instead gave time to organisational (and more impersonal)
reflection with only a handful of people speaking. In addition to making the majority of
meeting attendees passive ‘watchers’ rather than active ‘participants’, this also resulted in a
loss of ‘relational’ interaction between participants.
The notion of ‘affordances’ has been significant to the study of digital activism.
Affordances are the possibilities for action contained within a particular technology - and
users can be aware, or unaware, of these possibilities (Cammaerts, 2015: 89). The flipside of
affordances are constraints - the things a particular technology is incapable of doing. In one
respect, the Zoom platform contained the ‘affordances’ necessary for the Sydney Alliance
political practices to continue unchanged: the synchronous video technology allowed
meetings to continue as planned, with face-to-face interaction (albeit through a computer).

Indeed, in a Facebook post in mid-March, the Alliance posted an image of a zoom meeting
with the caption ‘still organising face-to-face’ (Sydney Alliance, 18th March 2020). Those
who did not have a webcam on their computer or a mobile phone with the capacity for video
calling could dial into meetings by telephone. After the first few meetings, organisers quickly
learned how to use the affordances of the Zoom platform to continue formal relational
practices in Alliance meetings - primarily through moving people into breakout rooms for
short ‘relational’ conversation in pairs or very small groups. Reflecting on the transition to
online organising, an organiser said ‘a lot of things we thought weren’t possible to do online
are possible’ (Participant 14).
However, the constraints of the platform meant the opportunity for the unstructured
social time that is so central to the Alliance culture was extremely limited: at one subsequent
meeting, the time spent ‘waiting’ for the meeting to start was filled with spontaneous
conversation by a couple of more confident meeting participants while others joined
(Fieldnotes, 26th March 2020). As there is only one channel of sound, there was a limit to
how many people could participate in this spontaneous social conversation without talking
over each-other, and only those confident enough to talk in front of the whole meeting spoke.
By moving the meetings to Zoom, the opportunity for spontaneous and informal ‘small talk’
that might often be enjoyed between two or three people sitting next to each other was
missing. Similarly, the practice of sharing food together could not be replicated. Even the
more formal relational practices were, at times, constrained by the VOIP technology. An
organiser noted ‘trying to have a relational meeting with someone over zoom and then the
internet just dropping out or things freezing, it takes away from the flow of the conversation’
(Participant 14).
The ‘relational’ culture of the Sydney Alliance does two important things for the
coalition – and their dilution through online organising has consequences for the political

culture of the Alliance. First, the formal and informal practices build collective identity - and
therefore the ground on which to take political action - in what is an otherwise highly diverse
body of participants. Theorists of collective action argue that identifying with a collectivity
‘including a sense of mutuality and solidarity’ is a pre-requisite for taking action together
(Hunt and Benford 2004: 434). Melucci’s (1995: 45) interactionist account of collective
identity claims that collective identity is a process - rather than fixed - and refers to ‘a
network of active relationships between actors who interact, communicate, influence each
other, negotiate, and make decisions.’ The act of ‘relating’ to another person in the
organisation - explicitly cultivated by the relational practices of the Sydney Alliance - is thus
essential for bridging the wide diversity within the Alliance. By emphasising the importance
of identifying how your personal experiences shape your public life and interests through
storytelling and listening to others in order to understand their political interests and
motivations, the Alliance builds collective identity not on shared interests but on a shared
commitment to relationships, listening, and curiosity.
Second, the rich network of relationships built across the Alliance - between people
from diverse civil society and religious organisations - is an important form of social capital
that forms the basis of much of the Alliance’s power. One of the weekly Sydney Alliance
newsletter emails sent mid-way through the COVID-19 lockdown stated: ‘Whether a disaster
is natural or economic, we know that two things are critical in a crisis: relationships &
coordination’ (Sydney Alliance 2020a). The relationships formed in the Sydney Alliance are
not a by-product of campaign work, but rather a goal in-and-of themselves. Wood (Wood
2007: 186) calls these ‘intentionally cultivated ties’ a ‘central font of strategic capacity’ and
argues that relational organising generates the ‘greatest strategic asset’ for broad-based
community organisations. The Alliance themselves, unsurprisingly, also recognise the
importance of the relationships built through their organising. The ‘micro-organizational

work’ (Stout 2010: 8) of relationship building between partner organisations and individual
participants is how the Alliance attempts to create democratic power and the capacity to
mobilise.
The Sydney Alliance was able to replicate the formal relational practices on Zoom –
nearly entirely unchanged although sometimes interrupted by technical difficulties. The
‘logic’ of action thus remained the same: the Sydney Alliance was still an organisation that
relied upon formal civil society organisations to provide pre-existing networks and worked to
build relationships oriented toward action through face-to-face meetings. The loss of
informal sociability, however, meant that the unstructured social time that formed the ground
on which the formal practices could more easily occur was missing. No longer could you
meet a new person informally at a large meeting – and then organise a formal relational
meeting if you seemed to share common ground. Nor was their time to have the informal
‘catch-up’ conversations – checking in on how a holiday went, what children are doing, or on
the health of a loved one – that often allow pre-existing relationships to flourish. As outlined
above, it is the depth of these individual relationships that allow such a diverse coalition to
take political action together. Over time, the loss of informal sociability will dilute the
relational culture of the Alliance. A study of two Israeli political networks on WhatsApp
found that the network that included casual social conversation had a different ‘affective
intensity’ and promoted conversations across political difference more readily than the
network exclusively engaged in political talk with no sociability (Kligler-Vilenchik 2019).
Relying only upon the formal relational practices to maintain the ‘relational’ political culture
of the Alliance means that interpersonal interactions within the organisation will be directed
toward political action much more explicitly – resulting in a more transactional political
culture.

Spatial Impact of Digital Tools on Organizing
The physical space available to and used by grassroots political groups shapes their culture
and strategy. Scholars have long theorised how space shapes social interaction – and in
particular how the design and accessibility of public space like streets, neighbourhoods, and
parks enable or constrain interaction and participation in democracy (Marston 2003; Martin
and Miller 2008). In many contemporary cities across the globe, so-called urban ‘public’
spaces are increasingly governed by the market – such as shopping malls or restaurants –
whilst streets and government buildings are tightly policed by ever-more militarised police
forces (Bodnar 2015; Davis 2006; Jones 2016). Despite a history of urban public spaces
being important spaces of political action (Arora 2014), physical space for free public
gathering by grassroots political actors is thus increasingly curtailed. Unlike movements and
activist groups that seize public space in disruptive protest actions, the Sydney Alliance uses
pre-existing congregational spaces across Sydney free from the control of either the market or
the state and in doing so, constructs and maintains a non-contentious and moderate political
culture based on relationality and political pragmatism. The COVID-19 pandemic, however,
forced the Sydney Alliance to fundamentally reorient their relationship to physical space and
the City as they moved their organising on to the Zoom platform and this, inevitably,
impacted upon their political culture.
Prior to the COVID-19 public health orders restricting public gatherings in Australia,
the Sydney Alliance utilised a range of physical spaces for their organising work. The six-day
residential training I attended in May 2018 was held in an old Benedictine convent building
in Sydney’s North-Western suburbs, now run as a Catholic retreat centre. Participants in the
training slept in narrow, simple bedrooms on the top floors where Nuns used to be housed.
The training occurred in large flexible rooms on the ground floor looking out to trees, next to
the window-lined dining room where we ate together that encompassed over a quarter of the

floor space of that level (Fieldnotes, 27th May 2018). Other meetings, trainings, and actions I
attended were held in the crypt of a central-Sydney Uniting church, in a decommissioned
chapel at a Catholic convent in Sydney’s Inner-West, and in the meeting rooms of various
trade unions in central-Sydney. The Sydney Alliance relied upon the physical infrastructure
of their partner organisations to host meetings and smaller actions: and as religious
organisations and trade unions make up the majority of partner organisations in the Alliance,
their spaces are most frequently used.
The spaces used by the Sydney Alliance are not necessarily ‘public’, but they do all
operate outside the control of either the market or the state. Further, they are specifically
designed for congregation. The use of these spaces for political action creates a
fundamentally different political culture within the Sydney Alliance than if they gathered in
and occupied (legally or otherwise) streets and government buildings. First and foremost, the
use of pre-existing congregational space is non-contentious. As I have argued elsewhere
(Author 2019) the Sydney Alliance is a moderate political actor and it draws political power
from bringing ‘unlikely’ political actors into political action – not from disruption and
contentious action.
Second, the trade union spaces and the religious spaces each impart different
characteristics to the Sydney Alliance culture. The trade union meeting rooms are typically
highly functional, with purpose-built whiteboards and fixed projectors, good lighting,
matching tables and chairs, and neutral décor. In some of the spaces, such as NSW Trades
Hall, the meeting rooms look out onto posters or banners celebrating and commemorating
historic trade union campaigns or advertising current ones (Fieldnotes, 19th October 2019).
The religious spaces are, usually, less functional: projectors are propped onto unstable tables,
much-used whiteboards are wheeled in, and a wide variety of tables and chairs make up the
seating, which are usually kept until they are no-longer usable. However, there is usually a

large kitchen with mismatched crockery and cutlery, a zip for boiling water, cups for tea and
coffee, and space to lay out and serve food.
Discussing the cultural differences of the trade union and religious partner
organisations in the Sydney Alliance, an ex-organiser said ‘So unions are really good at
acting, and they're not very good at relating or reflecting. And churches are really good at
relating, quite good at reflecting, and not very good at acting’ (Participant 16). The Alliance’s
political culture incorporates both: expending significant resources to build strong
relationships between both partner organisations and individual participants – evident in their
use of formal relational practices, and incorporation of informal sociability into all their
meetings and actions (discussed in greater detail in the following section) – and engaging in
highly pragmatic and strategic political actions and campaign that focus on concrete
outcomes.
A consequence of the Alliance’s use of pre-existing congregational space borrowed
from their partner organisations is that their political action is diffused across Sydney’s
suburbs. Where public assembly and political action is often characterised as a concentration
of bodies in space (Butler 2015), the Alliance rather engages smaller numbers of people with
relatively high frequency across the geography of Sydney. This has long posed a challenge
for both organisation and participation: in the early years of the Alliance they formed local
organising groups in the geographical regions of Sydney. These local groups ultimately failed
- they were a large drain on the organisational resources of the Alliance, as the dispersed
geography of Sydney made travel between the groups time consuming and costly for
organisers (and the Alliance didn’t have sufficient resources for an organiser for each group);
and as the structures of power in Sydney operated predominantly at the city (or even State)
scale, there were few problems that could be addressed solely by focusing on the hyper-local
(Interview, Participant 2).

Thus, although the Alliance organises on a city (rather than neighbourhood) scale, in
February 2020 (the month prior to the COVID-19 public health restrictions being
implemented) 14 of the 23 events and meetings listed in their weekly ‘Across the Alliance’
emails were held in the central business district or neighbouring, inner-city suburbs. A
member of the PSA team reflected on the difficulty of attending political meetings and
actions held in the city, although not by the Sydney Alliance, when she lived in the Western
suburbs: ‘if they [political actions] are in the city, that is not easy, necessarily, if you have
short notice, to turn up at a city thing that might be in the middle of the week’ (Participant
13). Organisers recognised this was an ongoing challenge with Alliance organising, with one
noting ‘when we’re bringing all the different voices of our communities together in terms of
people who live in Mount Druitt and […] in Vaucluse. Finding a location that is convenient
for everyone to get to at a reasonable time […] is really tricky’ (Participant 14).
The introduction of public health restrictions on gatherings in response to COVID-19
in March 2020 fundamentally reoriented the Sydney Alliance’s use of physical space and
relationship to Sydney as a geographic entity as they were forced to move their organising
online. In his study of a South Korean social movement, Lee (2016: 2259) writes that the
activists’ ‘appropriation of cyberspace’ was a reaction to the ‘fragmentation and
commodification of physical public spaces in Korean cities’ that stymied their efforts to
mobilise effectively in physical space. The Sydney Alliance’s pivot to exclusively online
organising was a similar reaction to the loss of physical space, although in this instance
because of state imposed restrictions on gatherings to control the COVID-19 pandemic.
These instances of ‘exploration’ (Lee, 2016: 2262) or appropriation of digital technologies to
circumvent state restrictions echo the hopes of early internet theorists that the internet was a
space of freedom with emancipatory potential (Daniels 2009; Loewenstein 2008: 9), and of

more recent digital activism scholars writing on ‘third spaces’ or new digital public space
(Arora 2014; Halafoff and Smith 2020).
Mattoni (2017: 501) argues that the increasingly widespread use of digital
communication technologies has changed the ‘temporal and spatial characteristics of political
participation and mobilization.’ Indeed, many studies of digital activism have emphasised
how digital technology enables activists to create global digital networks connecting local
struggles to each other. For example, in a study of an anti-mining camp in rural Sweden,
Dahlberg-Grundberg and Örestig (2017) identified how the use of digital technologies –
social media in particular – allowed the local activists to connect their fight to anti-mining
struggles and movement intellectuals globally, and for supporters unable to be physically
present at the site to organise parallel protests and actions in support of the cause. For the
Sydney Alliance, the transition to organising exclusively through digital technology did not
transform the scale at which they operate: on the one hand, the Sydney Alliance is already a
member of an international network of broad-based community organisations – the Industrial
Areas Foundation – with pre-existing and formal communication channels that pre-date
social media; on the other hand, they remain a city-wide coalition that organises to target
local councils, state government, and local members of federal parliament. However,
organising through video conferencing did transform the Alliance’s ability to organise
participants effectively across the diffused geography of Sydney.
Dahlberg-Grundberg and Örestig (2017: 312) note that while ‘movements are
increasingly … digitized … [they] tend to act from or around specific geographical places
and areas.’ In the case of the Sydney Alliance, this is the sprawl that is contemporary Sydney.
Using the Zoom platform to mediate meetings, the Alliance identified neighbourhoods in
Sydney where multiple existing and active Alliance leaders resided and formed ‘local
organising groups’ in those areas. By July 2020, there were 15 local organising groups

dispersed from Hornsby in the city’s north, to the Blue Mountains in the west, to Camden in
the south (Sydney Alliance 2020b). Some of these groups conducted ‘listening’ campaigns on
a local scale – collecting stories about the challenges facing local communities; others
attempted to build relationships with strong local civil society groups in their neighbourhood
to create a strong network of local, organised relationships in a traditional community
organising effort.
The local groups formed during the COVID-19 pandemic face the same challenges
regarding the concentration of power and decision making that earlier iterations of
neighbourhood groups did, but the use of Zoom rather than in-person meetings made
resourcing local groups significantly easier, with organisers able to attend multiple meetings
in different – widely dispersed – neighbourhoods on the same day without leaving their
home. Further, organisers found ‘it’s easier for people to come to meetings, especially after
hours meetings’ (Participant 14): Dahlberg-Grundberg and Örestig’s (2017) finding that
digital technology allowed supporters unable to present at the site of the anti-mining struggle
to participate through other means is born out in this case. Whilst the participants in the
Alliance are not dispersed across multiple countries, they do nonetheless face barriers to
participation such as inadequate public transport, long commutes to meetings, the cost of
transport, and insufficient time to attend meetings in person. Shifting the meetings to Zoom
thus removed (most of) these barriers for Alliance participants.
Where the use of religious and trade union spaces shaped the culture of the Sydney
Alliance prior to their use of digital technology for organising, the shift to conducting their
organising exclusively on Zoom invariably impacted on political culture. Scholars of digital
activism have noted it is a mistake to treat the internet as a ‘neutral’ space (Treré and Mattoni
2016: 291; Couldry 2015). Cauldry (2015: 621) argues that we must consider how political
action conducted online is ‘constituted by … platforms for data-led profit, not political or

social ends.’ Whilst the Zoom platform is not a social media platform, it is still a commercial
platform. Just as shopping malls and restaurants are designed for interactions predicated on a
market logic, so the Zoom platform was designed primarily for businesses and operates with
a commercial agenda. Alliance meetings were no longer being shaped by cultures of
hospitality, relationality, and political efficiency – but rather by commercial logic of a large
technology company: for example, meetings could no longer be hosted by anyone with the
willingness to do so, as the ability to host meetings with multiple participants lasting longer
than 45 minutes required access to a paid version of Zoom.
Further, multiple security issues have been reported on the platform – from ‘Zoom
bombing’ to the lack of end-to-end encryption (Lee and Grauer 2020; Marczak and ScottRailton 2020) – all making political organising work conducted on the platform vulnerable to
disruption and surveillance. In response to concerns that Zoom calls routed through China
could be monitored by the Chinese government, Zoom offered secured routing only to those
willing to pay for the privilege (Reisinger 2020). Meanwhile, as with large social media
companies, Zoom’s privacy policy allows the company to do ‘essentially … whatever they
want’ with user data (Reisinger 2020). These concerns were absent from the discussions I
witnessed within the Alliance during their period of organising exclusively online, and the
organisation risks treating Zoom as a ‘neutral’ online space – where the challenges to their
work come from apolitical technological constraints rather than the commercial nature of the
Zoom platform itself.
The activists in Lee’s (2016: 2259) study adopted digital technology in reaction to the
loss of physical public spaces in Korean cities. The Sydney Alliance’s pivot to online
organising was a similar response to the loss of physical space, although in this instance
because of state-imposed restrictions to public gathering in response to COVID-19 rather
than a commodification of public space. This shift to relying exclusively on digital

technology to organise did not, however, change the scale at which they operated – nor did it
‘globalise’ their action. But digital tools did give the Alliance a solution to two spatial
problems: the closure of public space by the state due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the
challenge of coordinating and funding organising across the sprawl of contemporary Sydney.
Whilst the former challenge is short-term (in this particular case), the latter has been an
ongoing problem from the inception of the organisation and the Alliance is likely to continue
with a hybrid organising model after the pandemic, ‘I think when this is over we will still be
doing some meetings online or switch between doing some […] face to face and some online’
(Participant 14). Dahlberg-Grundberg and Örestig (2017: 312) argue that ‘activist media
practices, and digital articulations of political grievances, need to be understood not as
disentangled from physical geographies but instead, as intertwined with them.’ The Sydney
Alliance’s pivot to digital organising was a reaction to, and shaped by, the political and
spatial context of their offline world.

Conclusion
Digital activism literature has tended to focus on the transformative effect of digital
technologies on activism – particularly at the level of scale and the logic of action. This
article and the case study within it, by contrast, demonstrates how grassroots political groups
can harness digital technologies to solve problems of geography and restriction whilst still
maintaining a local scale and collective action logic. There are great instrumental benefits to
grassroots political groups in adopting digital technologies: such as organising across large
geographic space and lowering some of the barriers to participation in action. However,
whilst the affordances of a VOIP platform like Zoom may allow the replication of political
practices aimed at developing deep interpersonal relationships, it’s constraints nonetheless

‘flattened’ the distinctive relational culture of the Sydney Alliance by removing the
possibility for informal sociability.
Further, whilst digital technologies can be used to ‘escape’ restrictive physical public
spaces governed either by the market or the state, grassroots political groups cannot so easily
escape from commercial logic or surveillance when using corporate digital platforms like
Zoom. Further, even if organising could occur outside existing power structures in online
spaces, the issues on which many grassroots groups organise remain governed and shaped by
those very power structures and the groups themselves, inevitably, must shape their political
action and strategy to those structures.
This article has shown that, even when resisting the transformation of scale or logic of
action, digital technologies nonetheless change the culture of grassroots political groups
through flattening distinctive political practices and constraining the development of deep
interpersonal relationships. The use of VOIP platforms like Zoom by grassroots political
groups is likely to continue long past the end of COVID-related restrictions, given the
instrumental benefits of their adoption. Whilst we have a good understanding of how
asynchronous digital media platforms like Facebook and Twitter have transformed political
action over time, more study is needed into the use of VOIP platforms like Zoom by
grassroots political groups and the long-term effects on collective action cultures and
practices.
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